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Abstract
This is the rst study that assesses the economic eects of direct democratic
institutions on a cross country basis. Most of the results of the former intra-
country studies could be conrmed. On the basis of some 30 countries, a higher
degree of direct democracy leads to lower total government expenditure (albeit
insignicantly) but also to higher central government revenue. Central govern-
ment budget decits are lower in countries using direct democratic institutions.
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rect democratic institutions. The low number of observations as well as the very
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government  expenditure  (albeit  insignificantly)  but  also  to  higher central 
government  revenue.  Central  government  budget  deficits  are  lower  in 
countries  using  direct  democratic  institutions.  As  former  intra-country 
studies, we also find that government effectiveness is higher under strong 
direct-democratic  institutions  and  corruption  lower.  Both  labor  and  total 
factor  productivity  are  significantly  higher  in  countries  with    direct 
democratic  institutions.  The  low  number  of  observations  as  well  as  the 
very  general  nature  of  the  variable  used  to  proxy  for  direct  democracy 
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The Economic Effects of Direct Democracy – A Cross-Country Assessment 
1 Introduction 
A number of empirical studies have shown that direct democratic institutions have 
significant and robust effects on economic outcomes. Matsusaka (2005, 185ff.) 
sums up the available evidence writing “Direct Democracy Works”. Some other 
recent studies (e.g. Bodmer 2004) have been more reluctant to assign substantial 
effects to direct democratic institutions in general but have hypothesized that it is 
very specific institutions, such as the fiscal referendum, that make the difference. 
Yet, to date all empirical studies have been constrained to analyzing the effects of 
direct democratic institutions within countries, most of these studies dealing either 
with the U.S. or Switzerland. 
Here, we are interested in assessing the economic effects of direct democratic 
institutions on a cross-country basis. This is a timely question as direct democratic 
institutions have been created the world over and are more frequently used than 
ever before: between 1991 and 2004, 517 popular votes on the national level have 
been  documented  (Institute  &  Referendum  Institute  Europe  2005b,  106). 
Although the majority of them was held in Europe (317), the spread of direct 
democracy seems to be a universal phenomenon: 85 took place in the Americas, 
54 in Africa, 32 in Asia and 30 in Oceania (ibid.).2 The question could hence be 
rephrased as “does direct democracy work in general” or – probably more to the 
point – “under what conditions does direct democracy work”? 
In their book-length study on the economic effects of constitutions, Persson and 
Tabellini  (2003)  have  analyzed  the  effects  of  constitutional  institutions  on  a 
number  of  variables,  including  (1)  fiscal  policy,  in  particular  the  size  of  the 
government, the composition of government spending, and the size of the budget 
deficit;  (2)  rent  extraction  by  the  government,  in  particular  the  perceived 
corruption of government and the effectiveness with which government provides 
public  goods  and  services;  and  (3)  composite  measures  of  growth-promoting 
policies  such  as  the  protection  of  private  property  rights  that  should  then  be 
reflected in labor as well as total factor productivity. 
                                                 
2   According to the Search Engine for direct democracy (http://www.sudd.ch), 432 referenda and 
initiatives were observed between 1985 and 1994 the world over. This number increased to 492 in 
the decade from 1995 to 2004. 
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Persson and Tabellini did not analyze the effects of direct democratic institutions. 
But it seems to make sense to use their endogenous variables in order to ensure 
the comparability of our results with theirs. We hence decided to use exactly the 
same endogenous variables here as long as there were no compelling reasons for 
some  modification.  The  indicator  used  to  proxy  for  “direct  democracy”  is 
provided  by  the  Initiative  &  Referendum  Institute  Europe  and  contains 
information on 43 European countries. By and large, our results are in line with 
the conventional wisdom gained on the basis of intra-country studies: concerning 
fiscal policy, more direct democracy does not translate into significantly lower 
central  government  expenditure  and/or  central  government  revenue.  Yet,  total 
government expenditure is lower when direct democratic institutions are strong, 
although  in  an  insignificant  way.  Still  referring  to  fiscal  policy,  the  central 
government budget deficit is lower with increasing degrees of direct democracy. 
Turning  to  government  effectiveness,  more  direct  democratic  institutions  are 
correlated with lower levels of evaluating tax-cheating as justified. As expected, 
government effectiveness is higher and corruption levels are lower in countries 
with broad direct-democratic institutions. Both output per worker and total factor 
productivity  are  higher  in  countries  with  direct  democratic  institutions.  All  of 
these results should, however, be taken with a grain of salt due to a number of 
methodological  problems  concerning  the  number  of  countries  recognized,  the 
length of time that the direct-democratic institutions have been in existence and 
the method used to code for direct-democratic institutions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 surveys the empirical 
literature, the following section deals with possible transmission channels through 
which direct democratic institutions could have an impact on economic outcomes, 
section four describes the data and the estimation approach used here. Section 5 
contains the actual estimates and offers some possible interpretations. Section 6 
concludes and suggests a number of questions for further research. 
2 Survey of the Literature 
In real world societies beyond a certain size, representative and direct democracy 
are not an alternative. Rather, a different degree of direct democratic institutions is 
combined  with  representative  institutions  as  no  sizeable  society  can  decide 
directly on all issues. The authors of the Institute & Referendum Institute Europe 
(2005b, 228) define direct democracy as the right of citizens to directly decide on 
substantive political issues by means of popular votes, i.e. independently of the 
wishes of the government or parliament. They emphasize two implications of that 
definition: (1) direct democracy is to do with decisions on substantive issues – and 
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not on people; rights of recall and direct election of mayors and presidents are 
hence not part of direct democratic institutions. (2) The independence from the 
wishes  of  the  governing  implies  that  plebiscites  which  are  often  used  by  the 
governing to have their policies reconfirmed are not considered as forming part of 
direct democratic institutions either. 
With  regard  to  the  kind  of  institutions  that  qualify,  referenda  are  usually 
distinguished from initiatives. The constitution can prescribe the use of referenda 
for  passing  certain  types  of  legislation.  Usually,  optional  referenda  are 
distinguished from obligatory referenda. Here, agenda setting powers remain with 
parliament, but the citizens need to give their consent. Initiatives, in turn, allow 
the citizens to become agenda setters: the citizens propose a piece of legislation 
that will then be decided upon given that they manage to secure a certain quorum 
of  votes  in  favor  of  the  initiative.  Initiatives  can  aim  at  different  levels  of 
legislation (constitutional vs. ordinary legislation), and their possible scope can 
vary  immensely  (some  constitutions  prohibiting,  e.g.,  initiatives  on  budget-
relevant issues). 
In a paper on the effects of direct democratic institutions in Switzerland, Frey 
(1994) argues that there is a “classe politique” that would tend to cartelize against 
the  interest  of  citizens. Given  that  direct  democratic  institutions  exist,  citizens 
have the competence to constrain the power of this cartel. He observes that in 39% 
of  the  referenda  that  took  place  in  Switzerland  between  1848  and  1990,  the 
majority of the population was different from the majority in Parliament (ibid., 
73)  which  is  interpreted  as  a  proof  of  the  hypothesis  of  a  better  reflection  of 
voters’ preferences via referenda. If one assumes that politicians have an incentive 
not to be corrected by referenda, then they would try to anticipate the result of the 
referendum and vote accordingly. Under this assumption, the number of 39% is a 
truly stunning figure. 
Matsusaka (1995, 2004) has estimated the effects of the right to an initiative on 
fiscal policy among all U.S. states except Alaska. He finds that states that have 
that institution have lower expenditures and lower revenues than states that do not. 
With regard to Switzerland, Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) have dealt with the 
effects of a mandatory fiscal referendum on the same variables. They find that 
both  expenditure  and  revenues  in  cantons  with  the  mandatory  referendum  are 
lower  by  about  7  and  11  percent  compared  to  cantons  without  mandatory 
referenda. Pommerehne showed already in 1978 that tax rates are ceteris paribus 
lower when tax-payers decide themselves on the bundle of public goods supplied. 
Matsusaka (2004, ch. 4) also deals with the question whether initiatives have any 
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effect on the distribution of government spending between the state and the local 
level and finds that initiative states spend 13 percent less per capita at the state 
level  than  non-initiative  states  but  spend  4  percent  more  on  the  local  level. 
Proponents of direct democracy would interpret this finding as evidence in favor 
of the hypothesis that under direct democracy, government spending is more in 
line with the preferences of the citizens. Recently, Bodmer (2004) has poured 
some  water  into  the  wine  of  those  arguing  that  direct  democratic  institutions 
would  substantially  reduce  government  growth  by  showing  that  during  the 
1990ies, direct democracy had no effect on spending and deficits among the Swiss 
cantons. 
The next question we are interested in is whether direct democratic institutions 
have  any  effects  on  rent  extraction,  i.e.  the  perceived  level  of  government 
corruption as well as the efficiency with which public goods are provided. With 
regard  to  U.S.  states,  Alt  and  Lassen  (2003)  find  that  initiative  states  have 
significantly  lower  levels  of  perceived  corruption  than  non-initiative  states. 
Pommerehne  (1983,  1990)  dealt  with  the  effects  of  direct  democracy  on  the 
efficiency with which government services are provided. More specifically, he 
found that waste collection in Swiss towns with both a private contractor and 
direct  democratic  elements  is  provided  at  lowest  cost.  Some  of  the  cost-
effectiveness  is  lost  when  waste  collection  is  provided  by  the  town  itself  and 
additional efficiency losses materialize if waste collection is provided in towns 
without direct democratic elements. Blomberg et al. (2004) ask whether there is 
any  significant  difference  in  the  effective  provision  of  public  capital  between 
initiative and non-initiative states among the 48 continental U.S. states during the 
period  from  1969  until  1986.  They  find  that  non-initiative  states  are  some  20 
percent less effective in providing public capital than initiative states. 
Finally,  do  direct  democratic  institutions  have  any  discernible  effects  on 
productivity and thus on per capita income? Feld and Savioz (1997) find that per 
capita GDP in cantons with extended democracy rights is some 5 percent higher 
than in cantons without such rights. 
Frey  and  his  various  co-authors  argue  that  one  should  not  only  look  at  the 
outcomes  that  direct  democratic  institutions  produce,  but  also  at  the  political 
process they induce (e.g. in Frey and Stutzer 2006). Kirchgässner and Frey (1990) 
speculate that the readiness of voters to incur information costs would, ceteris 
paribus, be higher in democracies with direct-democratic institutions because they 
participate  more  directly  in  the  decisions  (ibid.,  63).  The  authors  obviously 
believe  their  conjecture  to  be  an  advantage  of  direct-democratic  institutions. 
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Supporters of representative democracy would supposedly claim that this was a 
disadvantage  because  voters  had  to  incur  high  information  costs.  Direct 
democracy would thus be a decision procedure in which resources were wasted 
whereas  representative  democracy  would  make  use  of  the  welfare  enhancing 
principle of the division of labor. Frey and Kirchgässner (ibid, 65) themselves 
emphasize that time is scarce and the number of questions that could usefully be 
decided by referenda was naturally limited in number. 
Benz  and  Stutzer  (2004)  have  recently  provided  evidence  in  favor  of  the 
conjecture  that  citizens  in  states  with  direct-democratic  institutions  are  better 
informed than citizens in purely representative states. Some European states used 
referenda  to  pass  the  Maastricht  treaty  whereas  others  did  not.  Relying  on 
Eurobarometer  data,  Benz  and  Stutzer  find  that  citizens  in  countries  with  a 
referendum were indeed better informed both objectively (i.e. concerning their 
knowledge about the EU) as well as subjectively (i.e. concerning their feeling 
about how well they were informed). The paper is also interesting because it is 
one  of  the  very  few  papers  that  deals  with  the  effects  of  direct-democratic 
institutions  in  a  cross-country  setting.  Most  prior  studies  have  focused  on 
differences between Swiss cantons (or towns) or between U.S. states (or towns). 
More cross-country studies are clearly a desideratum. 
3 Some Theory 
In  their  paper  on  the  effects  of  direct  democratic  institutions  on  total  factor 
productivity in Switzerland, Feld and Savioz (1997, 515) argue that due to the 
lack of theoretically convincing transmission channels, it would make sense to opt 
for the large picture, namely to inquire whether the presence of direct-democratic 
institutions  leads  to  higher  total  factor  productivity.3  In  other  papers  (e.g. 
Matsusaka 2005) three  possible transmission channels are rehearsed  again and 
again: principal-agent problems, asymmetric information and issue bundling. We 
confine our considerations to the principal-agent problem and issue bundling here. 
In a principal-agent framework, the citizens are the principals who are only very 
imperfectly  able  to  control  their  agents  –  namely  the  government.  Direct 
                                                 
3   They write: “…, there seems to be no simple theoretical reason how direct democracy should affect 
economic performance. It seems to be more interesting to analyze the contribution of political 
decision making mechanisms in terms of efficiency. This hints towards the composition of revenue 
and  expenditure,  the  efficiency  of  the  revenue  system  in  terms  of  tax  evasion  as  well  as  the 
efficiency of the provision of public services.” 
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democratic institutions can now have two effects, namely a direct effect which 
enables the principals to override the decisions of unfaithful agents and an indirect 
effect where the threat of drawing on direct-democratic institutions might already 
be  sufficient  to  induce  agents  to  behave  according  to  the  preferences  of  the 
median voter. Potentially, the reduction of the principal agent problem due to the 
existence  of  direct  democratic  institutions  could  affect  all  of  the  endogenous 
variables already mentioned in the introduction: if citizens prefer an expenditure 
level  that  is  higher/lower  than  the  government,  they  should  get  it  via  direct-
democratic  institutions.  It  is  often  assumed  that  governments  prefer  higher 
expenditure levels than citizens, in this case, we would expect lower expenditure 
levels the more important direct democratic institutions are in a country. 
But if it could also be the other way round, namely that citizens prefer higher 
expenditure levels than government, we cannot say anything about the sign of the 
coefficient anymore. This argument can also be applied to government revenue, 
the budget surplus/deficit, but also the composition of the government budget. But 
if  direct  democratic  institutions  can  lead  to  both  higher  as  well  as  to  lower 
government  expenditure,  we  should  specify  the  conditions  under  which  either 
outcome  is  plausible.  It  appears  reasonable  to  assume  that  left-of-center 
governments have a higher propensity to spend than the median voter and that 
right-of-center governments have a lower propensity than the median voter. This 
condition needs, hence, to be controlled for. 
Feld  und  Matsusaka  (2003)  use  a  very  simple  spatial  model  to  point  out  the 
possible  effects  of  direct  democratic  institutions.  The  model  is  based  on  the 
assumption that government wants to spend more than the median voter. The nice 
thing  about  this  model  is  that  it  enables  us  to  compare  the  effects  of  various 
institutions. Call 0 the status quo expenditure level, the ideal point of the median 
voter is indicated by M and that of the (median member of) parliament by P. 
Under purely representative democracy (institutional setting 1), parliament will 
implement its most preferred spending level. This spending reduces the utility 
level of the median voter: the spending level 2M makes him indifferent between 
the status quo and 2M, spending level in excess of 2M thus lead to a lower utility 
level. Given that parliament needs to get the budget approved by the population 
(mandatory  referendum;  institutional  setting  2)  the  voters  would  reject  any 
proposal that would make them worse off than under the status quo. Parliament 
anticipates this and proposes a budget that will not be rejected which means that it 
will be very close to the level 2M. How do results change if the referendum is not 
mandatory  but  optional,  i.e.  voters  have  to  collect  signatures  in  favor  of  a 
referendum which is, of course, costly? If parliament knows the costs (which is 
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assumed here), this third institutional setting enables parliament to spend more 
than under mandatory referendum. The difference in spending between these two 
institutional settings is exactly the amount of costs the voters have to incur for 
collecting  the  signatures  necessary  for  having  an  optional  referendum.  This  is 
expenditure level 2M+C in the graph. 
The last institutional setting to be introduced is the initiative. The crucial point 
here is that agenda setting changes from parliament to the population at large. If it 
ever comes to an initiative, spending level M would be realized. Kicking off an 
initiative is, however, not costless either and an initiative will only take place if 
there is a net gain to the voters after having taken the costs (K) into account. The 
higher the percentage of the voters who need to consent to an initiative the higher 
K. Parliament can avoid an initiative by proposing a spending level M+K. 
If we assume that the costs of collecting the signatures for an initiative K are 
smaller than the increase in the expenditure level preferred by the median voter 
(i.e. smaller than the axial sections 0M and M2M), we can rank order spending 
levels  as  “representative  democracy”  >  “optional  referendum”  >  “mandatory 
referendum”> “initiative”. 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
0                 M                 2M               2M+C               P                        exp.level 
status                             mand              opt                 repr 
quo                                 ref.                 ref.             democracy 
 
Of course, the ideal points need not to be ordered in the way assumed here. It 
might, e.g., be the case that the ideal spending level of a conservative parliament 
is  lower  than  that  of  the  median  voter.  This  would  still  imply  that  direct 
democratic institutions lead to outcomes that are closer to the preference of the 
median voter than purely representative institutions. But the possibility that the 
population  at  large  wants  higher  spending  levels  than  the  median  member  of 
parliament should be taken into account explicitly. 
We now turn to issue (un-)bundling. Given that different actors have different 
intensities in their preferences concerning various issues, the bundling of issues – 
also called log-rolling - can ideally make many actors better off and additional 
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welfare benefits can be reaped. Empirically, it remains, however, heavily disputed 
if log-rolling is not systematically misused in order to realize spending levels far 
beyond the optimal level of the median voter (Mueller 2003, 104-27 sums up both 
the theoretical as  well as the empirical evidence).  If this is the case, then the 
unbundling of issues can potentially be welfare enhancing. This argument need 
not  be  confined  to  fiscal  policy:  if  direct  democratic  institutions  prevent 
politicians  from  an  inefficient  bundling  of  issues,  this  could  also  increase 
government effectiveness and labor as well as total factor productivity. 
Until  now,  the  theoretical  arguments  have  closely  followed  the  prevailing 
literature  in  which  two  aspects,  namely  (i)  tax  evasion  and  (ii)  government 
corruption  have  played  a  minor  role  at  best.  With  regard  to  tax  evasion,  the 
argument  that  direct  democratic  institutions  improve  the  process  of  collective 
decision-making (as opposed to its results) that has been stressed by Frey and his 
co-authors becomes relevant: if citizens believe that they have a say in collective 
decision-making, this increases the legitimacy of the political system. If citizens 
view the political system as “their” system, the readiness to accept its decisions 
will be higher. This could translate into a lower propensity to cheat on taxes. 
High  levels  of  government  corruption  are  often  seen  as  the  result  of  low 
transparency  of  the  collective  decision-making  process  as  well  as  low 
accountability  of  politicians  for  the  results  of  their  actions.  Higher  levels  of 
transparency  would,  hence,  be  correlated  with  lower  corruption  levels.  The 
transparency  of  the  political  process  is  argued  to  be  higher  under  direct 
democratic institutions, at least with regard to the issues that could potentially be 
subject to a referendum or an initiative: decision-making will be subject to public 
debate and it will be more difficult to hide corrupt practices from the voters.4 
At the end of the day, economists are interested on the effects of institutions on 
income levels. Given that public goods are provided more efficiently  and that 
corruption levels are lower, this should also be reflected in labor productivity. But 
ex  ante,  we  cannot  exclude  the  possibility  that  direct  democracy  impacts  on 
economic variables in ways still different from those explicitly mentioned here. If 
this is a possibility, then direct democratic institutions could have an effect on 
bother  labor  as  well  as  on  total  factor  productivity  even  though  they  have  no 
relevant effect on the other endogenous variables. 
                                                 
4   It could be argued that the institutional possibility to kick out specific politicians by way of direct 
democratic institutions after they have proven to be corrupt could be an even more relevant check 
on corruption. An empirical test of this hypothesis is left to future work though. 
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In the introduction, the  question was  raised whether  certain conditions  can be 
named that need to be given if direct democracy is to have any effects. It seems 
almost  self-evident  that  direct  democratic  institutions  will  not  add  much  in 
systems  that  cannot  be  called  democratic  in  general.  Additionally,  it  has  been 
conjectured (Kaufmann et al. 2005, 179) that direct democracy will only work if 
the country has functioning media and the state operates under the rule of law. 
The media seem to be important for direct democracy as much of the discussion 
concerning the issues that the population will decide by way of popular vote will 
take  place  there.  If  the  media  are  government-run  or  government-controlled, 
serious discussion seems unlikely. 
As far as we can see, there have not been any systematic attempts to explain the 
emergence of direct democratic institutions.5 Having a look at Central and Eastern 
Europe and realizing that most of the recently passed post-socialist constitutions 
preview for some direct democratic element, the age of the constitution appears to 
be one possible explanatory variable. Constitution-making occurs in waves and 
also reflects the dominant thinking of the time in which constitutions are passed. 
Another variable that has intuitive appeal are other elements of the constitution 
such as whether it has a federal or an unitary structure. These are nothing more 
than a number of ad hoc conjectures and more work is certainly needed. 
4 Data Description and Estimation Approach 
Before describing the data actually used in this study, we want to list a number of 
variables that would be of interest in future studies: 
-  does the country know (i) a referendum, (ii) an initiative, or (iii) both; 
-  what is the relevance of mandatory referenda as compared with optional 
referenda  
-  how difficult is it to kick off an initiative? (the higher the percentages of 
signatures needed from the entire electorate, the more difficult (“costly”) it 
will  be  to  kick  off  the  process,  and  the  less  teeth  it  can  be  expected  to 
have);6 
                                                 
5   See also Matsusaka (2005, 197) who writes: “A difficulty in developing instruments is that we do 
not yet understand why certain states adopted the process and others did not.” 
6   Kaufmann (2004, 179ff.) contains a host of additional variables such as time allowed for collection 
of signatures, modus of signature collection, wording of initiatives/referenda, legal requirements. 
Most of them are difficult to quantify and it appears questionable how much additional information 
their recognition would really incorporate. 
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-  how difficult is it to mobilize a sufficiently high proportion of the electorate 
such  that  the  results  of  the  referendum  (of  the  initiative)  are  a  binding 
constraint on politicians? 
-  how  difficult  is  it  to  change  policies  by  way  of  direct  democratic 
institutions?  (what  are  the  relevant  majorities?  Supposedly  expressed  in 
percent  of  all  eligible  voters;  do  the  politicians  have  any  chance  to 
circumvent the results of referenda/institutions?) 
-  on what state-level are direct democratic institutions used? Most countries 
that have direct-democratic institutions do not use them on the top-level but 
only on the state or local level. 
-  Are entirely policy areas excluded from direct democratic institutions? Are 
other policy areas subject to mandatory referenda? Obviously, the larger the 
areas excluded, the lower the expected relevance, the higher the number of 
areas included mandatorily, the higher the expected relevance.  
-  How long have the direct democratic institutions been into place? This is 
obviously an important aspect if the possibility that the effects will only 
show in the medium or even long run cannot be excluded. 
-  Lastly, it is a well known fact that formal institutions are often not in line 
with their factual use. It might thus be useful to explicitly analyze the factual 
use of direct democratic institutions (taking, e.g., into account the number of 
times,  courts  have  deemed  initiatives  to  be  not  in  conformity  with  the 
constitution etc.). 
Feld  and  Matsusaka  (2003,  2706)  notice  that  “many  studies  combine  several 
institutional features into an ad hoc index of direct democracy” and point out that 
this does not allow to answer questions concerning the institutional details that 
possibly affect economic outcomes. This is why we also propose to look at single 
aspects of direct democratic institutions. 
In this study, we rely on the “Country Index on Citizen law-making 2004” as 
provided by the Initiative & Referendum Institute Europe. The index is based on 
four different categories (very fundamental, fundamental, important, and useful 
elements of direct democracy; the complete list of criteria can be found in the 
appendix). 43 European countries are then grouped into one of seven categories. 
These are (1) the radical democrats, (2) the progressive, (3) the cautious, (4) the 
hesitant, (5) the fearful, (6) the beginners, and (7) the authoritarians. Again, the 
precise definitions as well as the countries belonging to the various categories are 
made explicit in the appendix. 
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This index has definite advantages and disadvantages: an advantage of the index 
is that the authors have attempted to rely not only on the legal foundations of 
direct democracy in a given country but also to explicitly take its experiences with 
direct democracy as well as its entire political culture into account. This means 
that this indicator should not be subject to the fallacy of putting too much trust in 
the formal legal rules of a country. A definitive disadvantage is that the criteria 
used  for  weighing  the  different  criteria  remain  completely  opaque.  Another 
disadvantage is the rather limited number of countries for which information is 
provided. Additionally, many of these countries are part of Central and Eastern 
Europe, where direct democratic elements have only been introduced relatively 
recently which means that it is probably too early to show up in the economic 
variables. A desideratum for future research hence almost suggests itself: generate 
a  database  with  completely  transparent  coding  criteria  for  a  larger  number  of 
countries. 
Yet, in order to ascertain whether direct democratic institutions have any clear-cut 
effects at all, it appears completely straightforward to begin  with  IRI’s  Index. 
Compared  to  intra-country  studies,  cross-country  studies  pose  a  number  of 
problems that one should at least be aware of. In intra-country studies, the ceteris 
paribus condition is often a lot better satisfied than in cross-country studies: many 
factors  that  differ  across  countries  can  be  safely  assumed  not  to  display  large 
degrees  of  variation  within  countries.  This  means  that  the  number  of  control 
variables  used  in  cross-country  studies  should  be  higher  than  in  intra-country 
studies. The problem of our dataset is, of course, that it is relatively small to begin 
with and the simultaneous inclusion of many control variables thus overly reduces 
our degrees of freedom. 
The estimation approach used is straightforward and follows directly  from the 
theoretical part. We are interested in estimating the dependent variable Y that can 
stand  for  (i)  fiscal  policy,  (ii)  government  effectiveness  or  (iii)  economic 
productivity  of  a  country.  The  vector  M  is  made  up  of  a  number  of  standard 
variables conventionally used to explain Y. The variable DD is our measure of 
direct democratic institutions and the Z vector is composed of a number of control 
variables that can be both economic  as well as institutional. Models in which 
institutional variables serve as explanatory variables are always subject to serious 
endogeneity  issues.  We  believe  that  these  issues  are  particularly  relevant  with 
regard to government effectiveness and the economy’s productivity. The so-called 
Lipset hypothesis (1960) assumes that the level of economic development of a 
country has a direct effect on its likelihood to be democratic. Hence, it appears 
crucial to use instruments with regard to both government effectiveness and both 
12 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2006,  Paper 11
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2006/iss1/art11  13 
labor and total factor productivity. It has, however, not been argued that the fiscal 
policy of a country could induce it to be more or less democratic which means that 
it appears less crucial to introduce instruments with regard to the models in which 
fiscal policies serve as dependent variable. This is why we regress effectiveness 
and productivity relying on an instrument variable (IV) approach and fiscal policy 
with an OLS approach.7 The instruments used are spelled out below. 
                                      Yi = αi + βMi + γDDi + δZi + εi 
But before presenting the regression results, it might make sense to have a look at 
the bivariate correlations of the indicator with other political institutions. Table 1 
reveals that most of the correlations are not particularly strong. The two states 
with the strongest direct democratic institutions, namely Switzerland and the U.S., 
are federal states and it almost seems to suggest itself that there might be a strong 
correlation between making sub-units strong and giving the citizens a direct say in 
political decision-making processes. The correlation between the two is, however, 
only a meagre 0.212 and, on top of it, it has the “wrong” sign. If one wants to 
attribute any meaning to this finding at all, it would mean that federalism and 
direct democracy are substitutes, rather than complements.8 
The next four correlations all deal with the two institutions that occupy center-
stage in Persson and Tabellini (2003), namely the electoral system and the form of 
government.  It  seems  that  states  with  strong  direct-democratic  institutions  are 
more likely to have proportional rule than majority rule. It also seems that strong 
direct democratic institutions are more likely to come along with parliamentary 
than with presidential systems. As the  combination between majority  rule and 
presidential system was found to have huge effects (e.g. on the fiscal policy of a 
state, in Persson and Tabellini), it is particularly interesting to ask whether strong 
direct democratic institutions can work as a corrective device in states that have a 
combination of parliamentary systems with proportional rule. 
Additional aspects of the electoral system that were taken into account by Persson 
and  Tabellini  (2003)  dealt  with  the  share  of  legislators  that  were  elected  in 
national districts and the size of the districts expressed as “districts/seats”. The 
                                                 
7   The robustness of the results was tested by using an IV approach with regard to fiscal policy and an 
OLS approach with regard to both government effectiveness and productivity. 
8   Most indicators of federalism have been quite controversial. If one uses the dummy constructed by 
Treisman (2000) based on Riker (1964) and Elazar (1995) instead of the Adserà indicator, the 
coefficient turns negative but remains insignificant. 
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conjecture motivating the inclusion of these variables is that transparency of what 
the  legislators  do  and  subsequently  their  accountability  to  the  constituents  are 
supposed to be higher if only a small share is elected in national districts and if 
district magnitude is small. Concerning the correlation of these two variables with 
the  direct  democratic  indicator,  one  could  expect  that  direct  democratic 
institutions  are  a  signal  for  attributing  transparency  and  accountability  an 
important place and would hence expect that more direct democratic institutions 
should be correlated with a small share of legislators elected in national districts 
and small district magnitude. This is, indeed, the case. 
The variable “first year of democratic rule” indicates the first year in which a 
country has been rated as democratic without interruption. It could be conjectured 
that  higher  levels  of  direct  democracy  enable  countries  to  better  implement 
democracy in general. If this was the case we would see a positive coefficient 
which is indeed the case. Alternatively, we have tested the correlation between the 
age of the current constitution and the indicator of direct democracy. The positive 
coefficient means that the older the constitution, the higher the degree of direct 
democracy. This is somewhat of a surprise given that the notions of more direct 
citizen participation seem to have developed rather recently. 
More generally, direct democratic institutions could be expected to go hand in 
hand  with  more  democratic  regimes  and  higher  degrees  of  freedom.9  This  is 
indeed the case and the two correlations are the highest in the entire table. We 
further tested whether there is a correlation between the factual independence of a 
country’s  judiciary  and  its  direct  democratic  institutions.  Based  on  30 
observations, the two are almost perfectly uncorrelated. Finally, one could expect 
people in countries with a high degree of direct democracy to be happier than 
those who only enjoy low degrees of direct democracy. This does, indeed, seem to 
be the case. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9   The Gastil-Index used here is a combination of the two indicators that distinguish between political 
freedom and civil liberties. It thus covers a broad concept of freedom. The Index is coded from 1 
(most democratic) to 7 (least democratic). All countries in the sample have scores of 5 and better 
except one, namely Belarus and Azerbaijan that are both coded 6. 
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Table 1: Bivariate Bravais-Pearson Correlations of Direct Democracy (1-7; 
1=radical democrats) and other Country Characteristics
1 
 
1)  All the data – except the last three indicators – on other country characteristics are available on the 
homepage provided by Persson and Tabellini: http://www.igier.uni-
bocconi.it/whos.php?vedi=1168&tbn=albero&id_folder=177 5. ‘**’, ‘*’ or ‘(*)’ show that the estimated 
parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively 
 
After having become familiar with the bivariate correlations between the indicator 
of direct democracy used here and various other variables of interest, we now turn 
to the econometric evidence. 
5 Estimation Results and their Interpretation 
Table  2  contains  a  number  of  (broadly  delineated)  fiscal  policy  variables  as 
dependent variables. Based on OLS-regressions, the direct democratic indicator is 
used as one of the independent variables and we are interested in ascertaining the 
effects of direct democratic institutions. Empirical studies from Switzerland and 
the U.S. have usually found that the stronger the institutions of direct democracy, 
the  lower  the  government  expenditure,  but  also  government  revenue  and  the 
  Source  Correlation  N 
Federalism (0,1; 1=federal structure)  Adserà et al. 2001.  0.212  30 
Electoral System (0,1; 1=plurality rule)  Persson/Tabellini 2003  0.361*  32 
Form of Government (0,1; 1=presidential regime)  Persson/Tabellini 2003  0.398*  32 
Share of legislators elected in national districts  Seddon et al. 2001  0.501**  28 
District Magnitude (Districts/Seats)  Persson/Tabellini 2003  0.396*  32 
Gastil Index (1-7; 1=highest degree of freedom)  Freedom House 2000  0.684**  32 
First year of democratic rule (year)  Persson/Tabellini 2003  0.448**  32 
Age of Constitution (year)  Own calculation  0.417**  38 
De Facto Independence (0-1; 1= very independent)  Feld/Voigt 2003  0.018  30 
Happiness (0-10; 0=not happy)  Veenhoven 2004  -0.559**  37 
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budget deficit. The picture that we get from the cross-country analysis points into 
the same direction but is not nearly as clear-cut as that from the former studies: 
The  effect  of  direct  democratic  institutions  for  explaining  differences  in  total 
government expenditure has the expected sign but does not reach conventional 
levels  of  significance.  The  very  high  level  of  significance  of  the  presidential 
regime variable appears noteworthy:  It means that presidential regimes have a 
significantly higher total government expenditure expressed as a share of GDP 
than non-presidential (i.e. parliamentary) systems.10 
Notice that Persson and Tabellini (2003) do not use total but central government 
expenditure. We prefer total over central expenditure here as direct democratic 
institutions  often  do  not  play  a  role  on  the  top  level  but  rather  on  the  levels 
below.11 Matsusaka (1995, 608f.) noticed that within the U.S., the existence of 
initiatives affected the composition of government expenditures between the state 
and the local level: whereas state level spending was reduced, local level spending 
was significantly higher in initiative states. It would thus be desirable to have a 
closer look at government expenditures at lower government levels. 
Column 2 displays the regression in which central government revenue serves as 
the  dependent  variable.  If  the  theoretical  conjecture  is  that  direct  democratic 
institutions lead to less expenditure, one would expect that they should also lead 
to less revenue. Yet, the negative coefficient indicates that more direct democratic 
elements are correlated with higher government revenues. The direct democratic 
variable  is  now  marginally  significant.  Furthermore,  it  is  noteworthy  that  the 
dummy variable indicating whether a system is presidential or parliamentary loses 
its  significance  if  direct  democracy  is  estimated  simultaneously.  Hence,  the 
Persson  and  Tabellini  results  where  this  variable  was  significant  on  the  one 
                                                 
10   This result sheds some doubt on the robustness of the Persson and Tabellini (2003) results with 
regard to the lower propensity to spend of presidential systems. If one does not confine the analysis 
to the central level (as Persson and Tabellini do) but looks at the total amount of spending, their 
results are exactly reversed. Given that these results carry over to larger samples, one would have to 
inquire into the transmission mechanism that leads to higher amount of government spending on 
the lower levels in presidential systems. This is, however, a topic for a different paper. 
11   Regressing central government expenditure on direct democracy leads to a negative sign of the 
coefficient (implying that higher levels of direct democracy lead to more expenditure). Again, this is 
not significant on a conventional level. 
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percent  level  does  not  appear  robust  to  the  inclusion  of  other  institutional 
variables.12 
Having a look at the central government budget deficit (column 3) shows that 
stronger direct democratic institutions are correlated with lower deficits. This is in 
line with theoretical expectations and statistically, the effect is highly significant. 
The  economic  significance  seems  to  be  substantial  too:  Every  one-step 
improvement of direct democracy (remember that there are seven groups) goes 
along with a reduction of the central government budget deficit of more than one 
percentage point. 
The variable social services and welfare spending (column 4) is defined as the 
central government expenditures consolidated on social services and welfare as a 
percentage  of  GDP.  As  it  refers  to  central  government  expenditures,  direct 
democracy should not be expected to have a substantial influence as that should 
rather show up in the lower levels. This is indeed the case. As expected, the single 
most significant explanatory variable of social security and welfare spending is 
the  share  of  the  population  beyond  the  age  of  65.  In  line  with  Persson  and 
Tabellini,  presidential  regimes  spend  significantly  less  on  social  services  and 
welfare on the central level than do parliamentary systems.  
The last dependent variable in table 2 is not based on hard numbers (as the other 
variables) but rather on subjective evaluations. It deals with the issue whether 
persons polled think that cheating on taxes is justified. The variable is based on a 
question of the World Values Survey (“Please tell me for each of the following 
statements  whether  you  think  it  can  always  be  justified,  never  be  justified,  or 
something in between: …. Cheating on tax if you have the chance [% “never 
justified” code 1 from a ten-point scale where 1= never and 10 = always]). It has 
been argued that direct democratic institutions improve the process of political 
decision-making and would hence improve the legitimacy of political decisions. If 
that hypothesis were correct, more direct democracy should be correlated with a 
lower propensity to cheat on taxes. This is indeed the case. The economic effect 
is, however, rather small: a jump from the group of countries with the least use of 
direct democracy into the group that rely on direct democratic institutions most 
heavily would only result in an improvement of one category (out of ten) with 
regard  to  considering  cheating  on  taxes  as  justified.  Additionally,  it  is  worth 
                                                 
12   In  order  to  ensure  comparability  of  the  results,  all  the  control  variables  used  in  Persson  and 
Tabellini were also controlled for here (see the bottom of table 2 for details). 
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mentioning  that  people  in  presidential  regimes  have  a  significantly  higher 
propensity to cheat on taxes than people in parliamentary regimes. 
Table 2: Direct Democracy and Fiscal Policy (OLS-Regressions) 
 
Persson and Tabellini test whether their variables are robust to the inclusion of a 
host of additional variables. Since we are interested in achieving comparability of 
our results with theirs, we test for the robustness of our results by including many 
additional  variables.  All  specifications  are  robust  to  the  inclusion  of:  age  of 
Democracy,  percentage  of  population  between  the  age  15  and  64,  OECD-
Total Go-
vernment Ex-
penditure/GDP
3 
Central 
Government 
Revenue/GDP
1 
Central 
Government 
Budget surplus
1 
Social Services 
and Welfare 
Spendings
1 
Cheating on 
Taxes
2 (1-10; 
1=not justif.) 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Independent 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
GDP per Capita 1990 
in log form
3 
-29.736** 
(3.016) 
3.599 
(0.617) 
-2.758 
(1.113) 
4.196 
(0.820) 
-0.083 
(0.135) 
Sum of Exports and 
Imports/GDP
1 
0.100** 
(2.961) 
0.047(*) 
(1.722) 
0.040** 
(3.881) 
0.011 
(0.505) 
0.007** 
(3.529) 
% of Population above 
the age of 65
1 
1.320* 
(2.246) 
0.851 
(1.351) 
-0.290 
(1.204) 
0.845* 
(2.036) 
0.130** 
(3.147) 
Federalism (0,1; 
1=federal structure)
1 
-1.551 
(1.394) 
-6.386* 
(2.068) 
1.629 
(0.966) 
0.768 
(0.617) 
-0.342(*) 
(1.924) 
Presidential Regime 
(0,1; 1=presidential)
1 
9.045** 
(6.307) 
-7.023 
(1.555) 
-1.106 
(0.847) 
-3.046(*) 
(1.869) 
0.805** 
(5.745) 
Direct Democracy (1,7; 
1=radical democrats)
4 
1.073 
(1.365) 
-1.953(*) 
(1.636) 
-1.096** 
(2.714) 
-0.932 
(1.099) 
0.133* 
(2.549) 
           
Constant  195.08  1.94  20.77  -25.18  0.30 
Adjusted R
2  0.576  0.548  0.394  0.416  0.377 
SER  4.969  5.744  2.265  3.980  0.406 
J.-B.  0.809  0.100  1.242  1.127  0.477 
Observations  28  27  27  28  27 
All models are robust to the inclusion of age of democracy, percentage of population between 15 and 64, OECD-
Membership, a plurality rule dummy (all from Persson and Tabellini), Press Freedom (Freedom House), the Rule 
of Law (Heritage Foundation) as well as a Political Conflict Index (CNTS Database). 
1) Persson/Tabellini 2003 (http://www.igier.uni-bocconi.it/whos.php?vedi=1168&tbn=albero&id_folder=177);  
2) World Value Survey 2001; 3) Heston et al. 2002 (Penn World Tables 6.1); 4) Kaufmann 2004/2005 (IRI).  
The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics, based on the White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. ‘**’, ‘*’ or ‘(*)’ show that the estimated parameter is significantly 
different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. SER is the standard error of the regression, and 
J.–B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals.  
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Membership, and a Plurality Rule Dummy (all from the Persson/Tabellini Data 
Set).  The  inclusion  of  the  Gastil-index,  hence  a  very  broad  indicator  for  the 
quality  of  political  institutions,  makes  the  direct  democratic-indicator  lose  its 
significance in estimation 2, whereas it keeps its significance in both estimations 3 
and 5.13 
It has been argued that direct democracy would only be relevant in certain more 
general environments in which governments generally adhere to the rule of law, 
the  press  can  freely  criticize  government  etc.  This  is  why  we  also  included 
variables  proxying  for  Press  Freedom  (Freedom  House),  the  Rule  of  Law 
(Heritage Foundation) as well as a Political Conflict Index (CNTS Database). The 
Political Conflict Index is composed of eight single variables, namely the number 
of  assassinations,  the  number  of  general  strikes,  the  occurrence  of  guerilla 
warfare, the occurrence of government crises, purges, riots, revolutions, and anti-
government  demonstrations.  The  estimated  results  are,  however,  robust  to  the 
inclusion of all of these variables. 
We  now  turn  to  the  estimates  that  deal  with  the  effect  of  direct  democratic 
institutions  on  political  rents  and  productivity.  As  already  mentioned  above, 
endogeneity problems loom large here. This possibility is especially severe within 
the dataset used here as it contains many Central and Eastern European countries 
that have ratified their constitutions within the last decade. This is why we work 
with instrumental variables with regard to both political rents and productivity. 
The problem of adequate instruments is particularly  severe in this case as the 
theory of endogenous direct democratic institutions is virtually non-existing. This 
is why we have opted for two different very pragmatic approaches: on the one 
hand, we use the age of democracy as a single instrument. When discussing some 
bivariate correlations above, it was already noted that older democracies tend to 
draw more heavily on direct democratic institutions; there is a highly significant 
correlation between age of democracy and direct democracy – and only a low one 
between age of democracy and the error term. 
                                                 
13   Hungary is an outlier; if it is excluded from the estimations, the results become stronger. It is 
noteworthy that the indicators for both presidential system and majority rule become insignificant 
as soon as direct democracy is introduced instead of the Gastil-index as a control variable. In other 
words: had Persson and Tabellini (2003) introduced direct democracy as a control variable instead 
of the Gastil-index would their results have been less significant – at least based on the sample of 
countries used here. 
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On the other hand, we  draw on a paper by Tavares and Waziarg  (2001) who 
identified a number of  variables that had a significantly positive effect on the 
observed level of democracy (in general – not specifically with regard to direct 
democracy),  namely  the  log  of  per  capita  income  (in  this  case  for  1990),  the 
growth  rate  between  1990  and  2000,  the  distribution  of  wealth  in  a  country 
(operationalized by way of the GINI coefficient), the level of education (primary 
and  secondary  school  entrollment),  and  the  given  degree  of  ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization. The estimates based on these two different approaches are very 
similar.  Here,  we  only  report  the  results  based  on  the  “age  of  democracy” 
instrument as no problem with over-identification occurs. 
The first model shows that stronger direct democratic institutions are marginally 
significant  for  explaining  variation  in  government  effectiveness  over  the  30 
countries  for  which  information  was  available.  Many  studies  interested  in  the 
analysis  of  corruption  rely  either  on  the  data  contained  in  the  World  Bank’s 
Governance Indicators (Kaufman et al. 2003) or on the meta-survey published 
annually by the NGO Transparency International. As a sort of robustness test we 
regress either indicator (columns 2 and 3) on our direct democracy variable. In 
both estimates, the coefficient has the expected sign (implying that more direct 
democracy leads to lower levels of perceived corruption) but the significance level 
is only 10 percent in case of the Kaufman indicator (and only in a one-tailed test). 
Note, however, the very high values for the determination coefficient. We finally 
deal with the relationship between direct democracy and productivity. With regard 
to both output per worker and to total factor productivity, direct democracy has 
the expected sign: higher levels of direct democracy are correlated with higher 
productivity. Here, the direct democratic variable is significant in both estimates. 
It is, however, noteworthy to point out that the number of countries for which data 
are available is only 24 in these cases, which means that the results should be 
taken with a grain of salt. 
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Table  3:  Direct  Democracy  and  Political  Rents  and  Productivity  (TSLS-
Regressions) 
 
Government 
Effectiveness
1 
(0-10; 0=good) 
Perception of 
Corruption
1 
(0-10; 0=little) 
Corruption 
Index (CPI)
1 
(0-10; 0=little) 
Output per 
Worker 2000 in 
log form
2 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
2000
3  
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Independent 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
GDP per Capita 1990 
in log form
2 
-1.592 
(1.367) 
-1.690 
(1.426) 
-2.078 
(1.195)  -  - 
Sum of Exports and 
Imports/GDP
1 
0.008(*) 
(1.615) 
0.014* 
(2.324) 
0.018* 
(2.148)  -  - 
Natural logarithm of 
total population
1 
0.129 
(1.272) 
0.396* 
(2.389) 
0.735** 
(3.080)  -  - 
Primary and secondary 
school enrollment
1 
-0.034 
(1.429) 
-0.033 
(1.562) 
-0.062(*) 
(1.962)  -  - 
Gastil-Index of 
Freedom (1-7; 1=free)
1 
0.792** 
(3.426) 
0.764** 
(3.728) 
0.292 
(1.277)  -  - 
Frankel-Romer 
forecasted trade share
1  -  -  - 
0.044 
(1.151) 
0.214* 
(2.530) 
Distance from the 
equator (in degrees)
1  -  -  - 
0.529 
(1.404) 
-1.240 
(1.640) 
Presidential Regime 
(0,1; 1=presidential)
1  -  -  - 
0.037 
(0.616) 
-0.471** 
(3.155) 
Direct Democracy (1,7; 
1=radical democrats)
4 
0.580(*) 
(1.883) 
0.487 
(1.550) 
1.062* 
(2.299) 
-0.169** 
(2.926) 
-0.264* 
(2.449) 
           
Constant  13.51  13.23  17.02  7.35  1.83 
Adjusted R
2  0.851  0.851  0.795  0.483  0.349 
SER  0.706  0.743  1.090  0.152  0.279 
J.-B.  3.086  2.258  0.607  1.148  0.666 
Observations  30  30  29  24  24 
All models are robust to the inclusion of OECD-Membership, a federalism dummy, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, share of protestants among population, a plurality rule dummy, a presidential regime dummy, 
district magnitude (all from Persson and Tabellini), Press Freedom (Freedom House), as well as the Rule of Law 
(Heritage Foundation) as well as a Political Conflict Index (CNTS Database). 
1) Persson/Tabellini 2003 (http://www.igier.uni-bocconi.it/whos.php?vedi=1168&tbn=albero&id_folder=177);  
2) Heston et al. 2002 (Penn World Tables 6.1); 3) Modified Hall/Jones 1999 4) Kaufmann 2004/2005 (IRI).  
The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics, based on the White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. ‘**’, ‘*’ or ‘(*)’ show that the estimated parameter is significantly 
different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. SER is the standard error of the regression, and 
J.–B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals.  
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It was already pointed out that both presidential form of government and majority 
rule turned out to be insignificant as soon as direct democracy was controlled for 
in explaining fiscal policy. This also holds with regard to both political rents and 
productivity.  This  sheds,  of  course,  an  entirely  new  light  on  the  Persson  and 
Tabellini  (2003)  results  as  they  are  much  less  robust  than  they  seem  to  be 
according to the authors. 
6 Conclusion and Outlook 
This  paper  is  the  first  attempt  to  analyze  the  effects  of  direct-democratic 
institutions on a cross-country basis. Most results are by and large compatible 
with prior studies that have focused on the analysis of Switzerland and the U.S. 
The results presented here can only be a very first step towards the analysis of the 
effects  of  direct-democratic  institutions  on  a  cross-country  basis.  Natural 
extensions include (i) to increase the number of countries represented in the data 
set, (ii) the use of more fine-grained indicators that allow for the analysis of single 
components which would enable us to identify the institutional settings that make 
a difference with more precision. It has, e.g., been conjectured that broad initiative 
rights  could  lead  to  more  government  spending  whereas  the  institutional  of  a 
fiscal referendum could cause the exact opposite (Bodmer 2004). Hence, a precise 
separation  between  the  individual  institutions  appears  crucial.  Taking  these 
additional conjectures into account, it is amazing how clear-cut the results attained 
here are. 
There are a number of questions that have not been dealt with in the intra-country 
studies but that could be relevant nevertheless. It has already been mentioned that 
the  spending  propensity  of  a  government  might  not  only  be  determined  by 
institutional factors but also by ideological factors namely by the issue whether a 
government is left (right) of center and has a higher (lower) propensity to spend. 
Another question that seems to be worth pursuing is whether the kind of revenues 
gathered by governments are also determined by the degree of direct democracy 
realized in a country. 
Additional aspects that have, at least to our knowledge, never been dealt with 
include  the  question  whether  political  business  cycles  are  “flattened”  if  voters 
have  the  means  to  do  so.  Conceptually,  this  would  seem  strange  as  the 
explanations for the existence of such cycles point out that additional spending 
would increase the likelihood of government to be re-elected. Frey and Stutzer 
(2000) have found that Swiss citizens who live in cantons with a high degree of 
direct democracy are happier based on micro-data and, hence, controlling for a 
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host  of  relevant  variables  such  as  occupational  status,  marital  status,  health 
conditions etc. It would be interesting to replicate this result on a cross-country 
level,  yet  micro-data  is  more  difficult  to  come  by  on  this  level.  But  we  have 
included  bivariate  correlations  between  direct  democratic  institutions  and 
happiness and they are highly significant. 
In this paper, we have referred to the work of Persson and Tabellini (2003) a 
number of times. At the end of the day, we are, of course, not interested in the 
effects of constitutional institutions in isolation but of their effects when they are 
analyzed as part of an entire constitution consisting of many different institutions. 
It has been noted that some of the strong effects found by Persson and Tabellini 
turned out not to be robust as soon as direct democracy was accounted for. This 
could be due to the low number of observations. But the more interesting question 
seems  to  be  whether  there  are  any  systematic  interaction  effects  between  the 
various constitutional institutions. We have looked at some interaction effects in 
our dataset but they are not particularly high. 
Suppose  that  a  more  extended  analysis  of  the  economic  effects  of  direct 
democracy still shows that there are a number of significant effects. It would then 
be interesting to go one step back and ask: why do some constitutions heavily rely 
on direct democratic institutions whereas others do not at all. It would, in other 
words,  be  interesting  to  endogenize  direct  democracy.  It  has  been  mentioned 
(Matsusaka 2005, Fn. 7) that the current state of knowledge is rather deplorable: 
„A  difficulty  in  developing  instruments  is  that we  do  not  yet  understand  why 
certain  states  adopted  the  process  and  others  did  not.“  Lots  of  work  remains, 
hence, to be done. 
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Appendix 1: 
Criteria on which IRI Europe’s Country Index is based: 
Category 1: Very fundamental elements 
Exclusions on issues, entry hurdles, time limits, majority requirements/quorums, the way signatures 
are collected. 
Category 2: Fundamental elements 
Role of parliament, finances and transparency, supervision 
Category 3: Important elements 
Periods of time, additional tools of direct democracy 
Category 4: Useful elements 
Support by administration, communicative infrastructure, intermediate results remain undisclosed. 
 
Appendix 2: 
The seven categories of the country-rating 
Category 1: The Radical Democrats 
Citizens have access to a broad spectrum of direct-democratic procedures. As well as the binding 
popular initiative, these include the right of facultative referendum and obligatory referendums for 
alterations to the Constitution and state treaties. 
Country: Switzerland 
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Category 2: The Progressive 
Citizens have, at least in part, the possibility of initiating national referendums without the express 
permission of the organs of the state (parliament, government, president). There are also procedures 
for obligatory referendums. 
Countries: Denmark, Ireland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Netherlands, Italy, Lithuania 
Category 3: The Cautious 
The electorate does have practical experience of popular initiatives and /or national referendums. But 
these procedures are essentially plebiscitary in nature, i.e. they are not protected or controlled by the 
citizens themselves or by the law, but are controlled “from above” by parliament (political parties) or 
by the executive. 
Countries: Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Portugal, Czech Republic, Belgium, France, Spain, Austria, Norway, 
Poland, Liechtenstein. 
Category 4: The Hesitant 
The political elites in the countries of this category appear to be afraid of popular participation in 
political  decision-making,  whether  out  of  fear  of  having  to  share  power  or  because  of  concrete 
historical experiences. Even here, however, there are still some traces of statutory I&R procedures, 
which may form the basis for future improvement 
Countries: Hungary, Sweden, Britain, Finland, Estonia, Germany, Romania, Malta 
Category 5: The Fearful 
Almost entirely lacking institutional procedures and practical experience, the countries in this category 
make it very hard for themselves to complement indirect democracy. In addition, the political and 
cultural  circumstances  scarcely  provide  a  stimulus  for  the  introduction  or  the  strengthening  of 
elements of popular decision-making. Nonetheless, the issue is occasionally debated. 
Countries: Croatia, Iceland, Greece, Cyprus 
Category 6: The Beginners 
These countries have only recently started their democratization process, including a respect for basic 
freedoms and human rights. Parliaments have been elected by the people, but there is still a great deal 
of mistrust between governments and governed, making the introduction of additional instruments 
like direct democracy extremely difficult. 
Countries: Bosnia, Serbia, Albania, Macedonia, Moldova, Georgia, Turkey 
Category 7: The Authoritarians 
In the countries belonging to this category, there is at present no basis at all for the development of 
direct democracy. 
Countries: Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine. 
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